The Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) is a technique that generates unique device identifiers based on variations in the manufacturing process. The Internet of Things (IoT) has become widespread, and various kinds of devices are now available. Device authentication and key management are essential to provide a secure service to these devices. We can use the unforgeable identifier generated by the PUF as a key for encryption and authentication. However, the existing PUFs require a dedicated hardware or low-level software, i.e., driver. Thus, they are impractical to use on smartphones or IoT devices due to the severe limitations of production cost and power consumption. In this paper, we propose a sensor-based PUF that utilizes the accelerometer and gyroscope, which are widely available on smartphones and IoT devices. We implement the proposed PUF on a smartwatch and show that accelerometer-based PUF achieves good usability, extreme robustness, and a high entropy of 91.66 bits.
INTRODUCTION
Android is an open mobile platform developed by the Open Handset Alliance (OHA) led by Google, Inc (Open Handest Alliance, 2010) . It had grown to be the top-share smartphone platform in the world (82.8% market share) in the second quarter of 2015 (IDC, 2015) , and more than 1,800,000 applications are available from the Android Market as of November 2015 (Statista, 2015) . Google have announced the release of the Brillo, which is an Android-based platform for the Internet of Things (IoT) (Google, 2015) . Users can add new features to their smartphones and IoT devices by installing applications. However, an attacker may analyze applications to find a secret key to decrypt protected content or get authentication information illegally.
One approach is to generate the unique key dynamically based on the device information of smartphone or IoT device. For example, the MAC address of a Wi-Fi adapter and Bluetooth adapter has been used as the input to a key generation function. However, the MAC address can be easily modified in a device where the administrator privilege is compromised. Furthermore, the current version of Android and iOS prohibit general applications from getting the MAC address. Android 6.0 (API level 23) returns a fixed value 02:00:00:00:00:00 for WifiInfo.getMacAddress() and BluetoothAdapter.getAddress() that is a method to get the MAC address of the Wi-Fi and Bluetooth adapter respectively (Google, 2015) . iOS7 returns the same value for similar APIs (Apple, 2013) . The protection of the key generation algorithm is another critical issue. The Android SDK contains an obfuscation tool: ProGuard (Lafortune, 2002) to protect against unauthorized analysis and modification. Nonetheless, this mechanism offers only limited protection since it relies solely on a software mechanism.
Another approach is hardware-based protection, and one idea is to use tamper-proof hardware. Mobile phones have a tamper-proof device, such as a user identity module (UIM) (3GPP2, 2000) or subscriber identity module (SIM) (The 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), 1990) that provides secure storage for service-subscriber keys and secure computational capability. The serial number of the SIM card can be used as a valid identifier. Android provides the getSimSerialNumber() method to get the identifier. The Trusted Computing Group (TCG) has established technology specifications for the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) that is available in smartphones and PCs (Trust Computing Group, 2016) . The TPM provides the cryptographic functions to enhance the security of the platform, and it is used as a root of trust. However, most IoT devices, including wearables, do not have dedicated hardware.
The Physically Unclonable Function (PUF), which generates unique device identifiers based on variation in the manufacturing process, is a promis-ing alternative. We can use the device identifier as a key. The device identifier generated by the PUF is hard to analyze since it does not appear in digital format on the device. However, the existing PUFs depend on additional and dedicated hardware; thus, they are impractical to use in IoT devices due to the severe limitations of production cost and power consumption. The Static Random-Access Memory (SRAM) PUF and Dynamic Random-Access Memory (DRAM) PUF utilize existing hardware, but they are still infeasible since they require low-level software, i.e., a driver.
Smartphones and IoT devices have various sensors and hardware such as an accelerometer, gyroscope, proximity sensor, microphone, speaker, and camera. Most wearables have an accelerometer and gyroscope to change the behavior based on user actions. In this paper, we propose a sensor-based PUF that utilizes the characteristic values of accelerometer and gyroscope. The proposed PUF is widely available on smartphones and IoT devices.
RELATED WORK
The Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) (Pappu et al., 2002 ) is a technique that generates unique device identifiers based on variations in the manufacturing process. The Arbiter PUF utilizes the difference in the signal transmission delay Lee et al., 2004) , and the Glitch PUF is based on the signal transition (Suzuki and Shimizu, 2010) . Kumar et al. proposed the Butterfly PUF, which uses the initial state of flip-flops (Kumar et al., 2008) . Gassend et al. proposed the Ring Oscillator PUF based on the difference in the oscillating frequency of the ring oscillator (Gassend et al., 2002) . Finally, Tuyls et al. proposed the Coating PUF based on the capacitance of the coating materials containing dielectric particles (Tuyls et al., 2006) . These PUFs depend on additional and dedicated hardware; thus, they are impractical to use in smartphones or IoT devices.
Some PUFs based on the existing hardware have been proposed. An SRAM PUF utilizes the initial data in memory when the power is turned on (Chopra and Colopy, 2009; Maes et al., 2009a; Maes et al., 2009b) . Krishna et al. proposed a memory-cell-based PUF that uses intrinsic process variations in the read and write reliability of cells in static memory (Krishna et al., 2011) . Liu et al. proposed a DRAM PUF that uses the decay time and output stability (Liu et al., 2014) . Keller et al. proposed a PUF based on the influence of temperature and time on the charge decay (Keller et al., 2014) . A DRAM PUF proposed by Tehranipoor (Tehranipoor et al., 2015) uses initial data similar to an SRAM PUF. However, the SRAM and DRAM PUFs are still impractical in smartphones or IoT devices. They require dedicated drivers to extract the characteristic features of devices, which imposes an additional cost.
Thus, we propose a sensor-based PUF for smartphones and IoT devices. The proposed PUF can extract the characteristic values of sensors through the standard API of the OS. Thus, it does not require the additional hardware and dedicated drivers.
PROPOSED METHOD
We propose a sensor-based PUF for smartphones and IoT devices including wearables. The proposed PUF acquires the maximum and minimum values of the accelerometer and gyroscope as the characteristic values of the sensors and generates device identifiers based on these characteristic values. We describe the features of the accelerometer and gyroscope in Section 3.1 and 3.2, respectively. Section 3.3 describes the method to generate a device identifier based on characteristic values of the sensors.
Accerelometer
A 3-axis accelerometer measures the accelerations along the x, y, and z-axis. Figure 1 shows the direction of these axes. Most smartphones and wearables have an accelerometer that can measure up to ±2 G (19.6 m/s 2 ) or ±4 G (39.2 m/s 2 ).
The maximum and minimum values of the accelerometer along each axis differ from one device to another. Thus, these values can be used to generate device identification data. We construct a 6-dimensional data set that consists of the maximum and minimum values along the x, y, and z-axis and extract digits that have enough variety. The characteristic value of the accelerometer can be achieved by concatenating these digits.
Gyroscope
A 3-axis gyroscope measures the angular velocities around the x, y, and z-axis. Figure 2 shows the rotation direction around these axes. Many wearables have a gyroscope that can measure up to 2000 deg/s (34.9 rad/s).
The maximum and minimum values of the gyroscope around each axis differ from one device to another. Thus, these values can be used to generate device identification data. We construct a 6-dimensional data set that consists of the maximum and minimum values around the x, y, and z-axis and extract digits that have enough variety. The characteristic value of the gyroscope can be achieved by concatenating these digits.
Device Identifier Generation
We now describe the detailed behavior of the sensorbased PUF to generate the device identifier. The identifier generation process consists of the acquisition of the characteristic values of the sensors (step 1) and identifier generation using a one-way function (step 2).
Step 1 Acquisition of the Characteristic Values of the Sensors. The sensor-based PUF requires the maximum values and minimum values of the accelerometer and gyroscope. A user needs to shake and twist the hand holding or wearing a device. This process stores the tentative maximum and minimum values of sensors. These tentative values are updated when the current sensor value is larger or smaller than the tentative maximum or minimum value, respectively. We consider the tentative values as the actual maximum and minimum values after a user shakes the device for a specified time (a few seconds), and the tentative values are stable. We show a sample imple- mentation of this step in the appendix.
Step 2 Generation of Device Identifier. The sensor-based PUF uses a one-way function to generate a device identifier from the concatenated characteristic values of the accelerometer and gyroscope. A device identifier has to vary with each application or service when the identifier is used as a key. In this case, applications or services can concatenate a seed to the input to the one-way function to fulfill the requirement.
We can use a fuzzy extractor (Dodis et al., 2008) to deal with minor deviations of the characteristic values of the sensors. The fuzzy extractor generates and registers a secure sketch SS for future identifier extractions in the registration phase. It generates the random number r, encoded with an error-correcting code C. The secure sketch SS is the exclusive-or of the characteristic value of sensor w, and C(r) or SS = w ⊕ C(r). The random number r is disposed of when the registration process completes. In the device identifier generation phase, the fuzzy extractor recovers the original characteristic value w from the secure sketch SS calculated from the current characteristic value w in the device. It calculates C(r) as
where EC is the error-correcting component and w ⊕ w denotes the minor deviation of the characteristic values of the sensor. Finally, the fuzzy extractor generates the device identifier as
using the one-way function h. Figure 3 shows the fuzzy extractor in the registration phase and Figure 4 shows the device identifier generation phase.
The sensor values for each axis can be considered as independent. Thus, the sensor-based PUF separately applies the fuzzy extractor to each characteristic value (maximum and minimum values for x, y, and z-axis).
The proposed PUF encodes the characteristic values of the sensor to binary data with Gray code. The Hamming distance between adjacent values is one encoding; thus, minor deviations up to ±t can be recovered with the error correcting code of t correction capability. However, the robustness achieved by the fuzzy extractor has a trade-off with entropy. We discuss the trade-off in section 5.2.
IMPLEMENTATION
We have implemented the sensor-based PUF as an Android Wear application. The PUF application is executed on an LG Watch Urbane smartwatch to evaluate the entropy and robustness.
The LG Watch Urbane has an accelerometer that can measure from -2 G (-19.6 m/s 2 ) to 2 G (-19.6 m/s 2 ). The maximum and minimum values of the sensor vary with the devices and axis. Table 1 shows an example. The number in the second decimal place and the following digits have enough variety. Thus, the PUF application extracts the numbers in the second to sixth decimal place as a character string with five figures from each of the maximum and minimum values of the accelerations along the x, y, and z-axis. The application can acquire the characteristic value of the accelerometer with 30 characters by concatenating these six character strings.
The LG Watch Urbane has a gyroscope that can measure from -2,000 degree/s (-34.9 rad/s) to 2,000 degree/s (34.9 rad/s). Table 2 shows an example. The number in the fourth decimal place and the following digits have enough variety. Thus, the PUF application extracts the numbers in the fourth to sixth decimal place as a character string with three figures from each of the maximum and minimum values of angular velocities around the x, y, and z-axis. The application can acquire a characteristic value of the accelerometer with 18 characters by concatenating these six character strings.
The PUF application generates a device identifier with 128-bit length from the characteristic value of an accelerator or gyroscope by using SHA-256 and truncating the last 128 bits. We do not use the fuzzy extractor in the application since it extracts the identical characteristic values from the accelerometer and gyroscope consistently. Figure 5 shows a photo of the PUF application on the LG Watch Urbane. The application regenerates and displays the generated device identifier whenever the tentative maximum and minimum values of sensors are updated. The tentative maximum and minimum values are reset to zero when the user presses the reset button (RST). The application stores the device identifier when the register button (REG) is pressed, and deletes the identifier when the unregister button (URG) is pressed. We can use this function to evaluate the robustness of the device identifier. The application compares the generated identifier and stored identifier and displays "OK" if they are identical or "NG" otherwise.
We have compared the usability of the accelerometer-based PUF and gyroscope-based PUF in an LG Watch Urbane. The accelerometerbased PUF can generate the same identifier within a few seconds. The measurement range of the accelerometer is from -2 G to 2 G, and the sensor value quickly reaches the maximum or minimum when a user shakes the device. However, the identifier generated by the gyroscope-based PUF is not stable. The measurement range of the gyroscope is from -2,000 degrees/s to 2,000 degrees/s. A user has to rotate the device around three axes at a rate of six revolutions per second, which is difficult if the user continues to wear the device. As a result, the accelerometer-based PUF is more useful than the gyroscope-based PUF in an LG Watch Urbane. Thus, we evaluate the entropy and robustness of the accelerometer-based PUF in the following section.
EVALUATION
We evaluate the compatibility of the sensor-based PUF with the requirements for PUFs. Then, we evaluate the robustness and entropy of the device identifier generated by the accelerometer-based PUF.
Compatibility with Requirements
Maes and Verbauwhede showed the requirements for PUFs: evaluable, unique, reproducible, unpredictable, one-way, unclonable and tamper evident (Maes and Verbauwhede, 2010) . We show the compatibility of the sensor-based PUF with these requirements.
Evaluable. The sensor-based PUF uses the characteristic values of the existing sensors, and these values can be acquired through the existing APIs. The PUF can be implemented as a general application at minimal cost. Furthermore, the sensor-based PUF uses only the extraction and concatenation of character strings, one-way function, and optional exclusiveor and operations for the error-correcting code. Thus, the PUF is feasible in resource-restricted devices.
Unique. The device identifier generated by the sensor-based PUF is unique since it has high entropy. We evaluate the entropy of the proposed PUF in section 5.2.
Reproducible. The device identifier generated by the sensor-based PUF is reproducible since it has high robustness. We evaluate the robustness of the proposed PUF in section 5.3.
Unpredictable. The sensor-based PUF is not applicable to the challenge-response model. Thus, we cannot evaluate the unpredictability of the proposed PUF.
One-way. The sensor-based PUF uses a one-way function to generate the device identifier from the characteristic values. The one-way function guarantees this requirement for the sensor-based PUF.
Unclonable and Tamper Evident. The sensorbased PUF acquires the characteristic values of sensors using software (application) and generates the device identifier. Thus, we have to protect against acquisition and modification of the characteristic values and generated device identification. For example, attackers can make a clone of the sensor-based PUF by acquiring the characteristic values of the sensor. They can also modify the values of the sensors or the generated device identifier in the memory. Thus, we have to protect against these attacks by applying memory protection techniques (Ostrovsky, 1990; Goldreich and Ostrovsky, 1996; Nakano et al., 2012) . Attackers may modify the identifier generation algorithm so that it outputs an arbitrary identifier. We have to protect these attacks by applying software tamperproof techniques to prevent modification of the application. We will study the security against physical attacks in our future research.
Entropy
We have evaluated the Quadratic Renyi entropy of the device identifier generated by an accelerometer-based PUF. The Quadratic Renyi entropy is defined as:
H 2 (B) is a particular case (α = 2) of the Renyi entropy H α (B), which is defined as:
The Shannon entropy is defined as
The Renyi entropy and Shannon entropy have the relationship: lim α→1 H α (B) = H(B). The Reyni entropy is decreasing with respect to α. Thus, the Quadratic Renyi entropy is smaller than or equal to the Shannon entropy, or H 2 (B) ≤ H(B). The same holds when the B is according to the uniform distribution. The ∑ b∈B p B (b) 2 is the probability that the two sampled values are identical, and the Quadratic Renyi entropy is referred to as the collision entropy. The Quadratic Renyi entropy can be written as
with the probabilistic mass function of the distance D between two sampled values p D (d).
The Quadratic Renyi entropy has been used to evaluate the entropy of biometric information (Hidano et al., 2010; Hidano et al., 2012) . However, it is difficult to predict the probability p D (d) directly with a limited number of samples. Thus, we used a nonparametric approach with a specific kernel function that can estimate p D (d) with a small error. Kokonendji (Kokonendji et al., 2007) proposed a nonparametric estimation of probability mass functions using discrete triangular distribution. The probability mass function can be estimated aŝ
where X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n are random samples from a count distribution with an unknown probability mass function. T a,h,x (X) is the probability mass function of the discrete triangular distribution of the order h and with the arm a. T a,h,x (X) is given as:
where
where n i is the number of samples whose distance is i. The asymptotic mean integrated squared errors are given by:
where V (a, h) is the variance of T a,h,x (X) as
and p (x) is the second derivative of p(x) as
. AMISE(a, h) is increasing with respect to a; thus, a * = 1 is the optimal parameter for a. The optimal parameter h * for h is given by:
We acquired 90 strings, which are the characteristic values of accelerometers described in section 3.1, from 15 of the same wearables (LG Watch Urbanes). Each string ranges from 00000 to 99999 and can be encoded with a 17-bit binary value. We exhaustively compared the binary values and studied the distribution of the Hamming distance. Table 3 shows the distribution of the Hamming distance, and it is similar to the binomial distribution. Thus, we used p(x) as the probabilistic mass function of the binomial distribution B(17, 1/2) to find the optimal parameter h * . AMISE(1, h) is increasing with respect to h; however,p D (0) goes to 0 as h → 0. Thus, a * = 1 and h * = 1/12 are used as the optimal parameters. The estimated Quadratic Renyi entropy of the artificially generated histogram of the binomial distribution B(17, 1/2) is 16.19 bits using the optimal parameter setting.
We can estimatep D (0) = 2.52 × 10 −5 , from the distribution of the Hamming distance in Table 3 . Thus, the Quadratic Renyi entropy isĤ 2 (B) = log 2p D (0) or 15.28 bits. The device identifier based on the accelerometer consists of six-dimensional data, and the total entropy is 91.66 bits.
We discuss the trade-off between entropy and robustness in the case where the sensor-based PUF uses the fuzzy extractor. The entropy loss of each characteristic value of the sensors is at least log 2 ∑ t k=0 n k bits according to the Hamming bound. n is the bit length of the encoded characteristic value, and t is the correction capability of the error-correcting code. The total entropy loss is at least 6 log 2 ∑ t k=0 n k bits. Table 4 shows the relationship between the correction capability of the error-correcting code and the upper bound of the total entropy of the device identifier generated by the sensor-based PUF. The device identifier generated by the accelerometer-based PUF can achieve more than 60 bits of entropy when the fuzzy extractor is not used, or when the fuzzy extractor uses the error-correcting code with one-bit correction capability. 
Robustness
The sensor-based PUF using an accelerometer and gyroscope can generate the identical device identifier within the same device without the fuzzy extractor. We confirmed that the device identifier generated by the accelerometer-based PUF is consistent by the fact that the same user generates the same identifier more than 1,000 times. Furthermore, more than ten users can generate the same identification within the same device. The accelerometer-based PUF generates the same device identifier regardless of the surrounding temperature. Finally, it generates the same identifier in -5 degrees Celsius and 90 degrees Celsius and at 2000 meters of altitude on a mountain.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a sensor-based PUF. The sensor-based PUF utilizes the accelerometer and gyroscope that are widely available in smartphone and IoT devices. We implemented the proposed PUF on a smartwatch and showed that the accelerometer-based PUF achieves good usability, extreme robustness, and a high entropy of 91.66 bits. Figure 6 shows a sample implementation to acquire the maximum and minimum values of the accelerometer in an Android device. The fields maxX, minX, maxY, minY, maxZ, and minZ are fields that store the tentative maximum and minimum values of accelerations along the x, y and z-axis. The method onSensorChanged is called when the sensor values have changed. We retrieve the event from the accelerometer by using the if statement. The acceleration along the x, y, and z-axis is stored in the values array. The same code where Sensor.TYPE ACCELEROMETER is replaced with Sensor.TYPE GYROSCOPE can acquire the maximum and minimum values of angular velocities around each axis.
APPENDIX
The sensor-based PUF needs to set the highest sampling frequency on the sensors so that we can efficiently acquire the maximum and minimum values. We can set the sampling frequency through the registerListener method in Android. The method registers SensorEventListener that is used to receive notifications from the SensorManager when the sensor values have changed. The notification frequency is highest, and the period is a few milliseconds if SENSOR DELAY FASTEST is passed to the method.
